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INTRODUCTION
Allies at the End of Empire—Loyalists, Nationalists and the
Cold War, 1945–76
David M. Anderson and Daniel Branch
ABSTRACT
The wars of decolonization fought by European colonial powers
after 1945 had their origins in the fraught history of imperial
domination, but were framed and shaped by the emerging politics
of the Cold War. Militia recruited from amongst the local population
was a common feature in all the counter-insurgencies mounted
against armed nationalist risings in this period. Styled here as
‘loyalists’, these militia fought against nationalists. Loyalist histories
have often been obscured by nationalist narratives, but their
experience was varied and illuminates the deeper ambiguities of
the decolonization story, some loyalists being subjected to vengeful
violence at liberation, others actually claiming the victory for
themselves and seizing control of the emergent state, while others
still maintained a role as ﬁghting units into the Cold War. This
introductory essay discusses the categorization of these ‘irregular
auxiliary’ forces that constituted the armed element of loyalism
after 1945, and introduces seven case studies from ﬁve European
colonialisms—Portugal (Angola), the Netherlands (Indonesia),
France (Algeria), Belgium (Congo) and Britain (Cyprus, Kenya and
southern Arabia).
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Introduction
The nationalist wars of liberation and decolonization fought in Africa and Asia against
imperial rule, from the 1940s to the 1970s, marked the death throes of the old European
empires, and heralded the birth pangs of the emerging states of what would collectively
become known as the Third World. These wars arose out of the local histories of European
colonial domination, and have been studied by historians primarily as individual episodes
of nationalist formation and state-making.1 Only relatively recently have historians begun
to acknowledge that the liberation struggles that took form after 1945 were framed,
shaped and connected by the emerging global Cold War.2 Some of these struggles had
their origins in the ideological contests that would become deterministic in the Cold War.
In Asia, French, Dutch and British colonialists, all fought to re-establish imperial rule in
their colonies at the end of the Second World War, the conﬂicts in Indo-China, Malaya and
the Dutch East Indies being immediately inﬂuenced by global movements and ideologies
just as they were adopting a nationalist conﬁguration.3 Other wars lacked ideological
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drivers, but nonetheless were adopted as sites of Cold War struggle with the support of
external actors. In Africa, external inﬂuence on national liberation came a little later than
in Asia, and in several different forms, but in Algeria,4 Congo,5 Guinea-Bissau,6 Angola,7
and even Ethiopia8 (whose anti-imperial revolution was not against colonialism), the poli-
tics and afﬁliations of the Cold War ultimately played a profound role in deﬁning the char-
acter of liberation struggle.9 Challenging though it surely is, historical understanding of
these Cold War interactions with decolonization is essential if we are to move beyond
viewing the end of empires solely from a metropolitan perspective of political manoeu-
vring and economic reorientation, and instead examine the process through the colonial
experience of conﬂict and its consequences in the making of nationalisms.10 Decoloniza-
tion did not originate in the politics of the Cold War, but its outcomes cannot be under-
stood unless seen in a Cold War context.
This collection of essays elaborates the connection between decolonization and the
Cold War through an examination of the wars of liberation fought in British, French, Dutch,
Belgian and Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia. The focus is upon counter-insurgen-
cies, and speciﬁcally the engagement of local forces as combatants to ﬁght alongside
imperial armies and against nationalist insurgents. For very obvious reasons, the histories
of such groups have remained obscure, often tainted or disparaged by a nationalist narra-
tive that styles them as mercenaries or collaborators, and always as enemies.11 Recovering
such histories requires a local perspective, but understanding the signiﬁcance of these
struggles demands an awareness of global processes and connections. As Thomas and
Thompson remind us, ‘Violent colonial collapse… was political contagion: the one irresist-
ible pandemic in the post-Second World War international system’.12 Their plea for a com-
parative and better-integrated history of decolonization, then, is addressed in the essays
gathered here, each describing colonial exit, and in particular the distinctive forms of vio-
lence, in the context of the Cold War.13 The collection includes a discussion of the catego-
rization of ‘irregular auxiliary’ forces after 1945,14 along with seven case studies of
insurgencies against ﬁve different European colonialisms—Portugal (Angola), the Nether-
lands (Indonesia), France (Algeria), Belgium (Congo) and Britain (Cyprus, Kenya, and south-
ern Arabia).
While it is not essential to ﬁnd a term that can unite these local allies of empire in a
common category, the lack of such a term has hampered any attempt at comparison. As
Kalyvas has noted, there is a tendency to think that all wars of this kind are complex, inti-
mate and intricate, and that they are driven only by the logic of local contestations.15 But
we contend here that these groups do have strikingly common features, that they behave
in similar ways, and are deployed in remarkably similar circumstances. Terms that identify
them as collaborators are undoubtedly too pejorative to be useful, inﬂaming political
debate rather than inspiring sober reﬂection. Borrowing from British imperial history, we
therefore propose a term that is at once more neutral, but also has sufﬁcient ambiguity to
accommodate a degree of variance: that term is loyalist.16
The local allies of empire took many names for themselves, invariably reﬂecting their
origins in the local identity politics under colonial rule, but their colonial masters were
most inclined to see them as ‘loyal’ forces. Though their terms of engagement and their
motivations varied enormously, all were groups that were willing to remain loyal to the
colonial regime in the face of the nationalist challenge. Such loyalty was often instrumen-
tal in achieving the protection or security of an identiﬁed community, it was frequently
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based in ﬁrm vested interest and it sometimes adopted a highly strategic approach to
conﬂict and violence, but none of this implied support for imperialism either in principle
or in practice. As Anderson notes, what European colonialists liked to term ‘loyalism’ was
not an ideology, but a predicament:17 it was invariably the outcome of difﬁcult choices,
made to achieve speciﬁc political ends, and with clear goals in sight. Those who took the
loyalist road were therefore exercising what Lonsdale has termed ‘agency in tight cor-
ners’.18 However, violence could, and did, distort loyalist intentions, creating deeper divi-
sions and greater rivalries, the longer an armed struggle continued. The entrenchment of
loyalism through violence, most vividly to be seen from the 1950s in Algeria and Kenya,
was what turned it from a momentary strategic act, into a more profound political com-
mitment for which a high price might have to be paid in defeat—as in Algeria19—or the
ultimate prize seized in victory, control of the state itself—as in Kenya.20
To introduce the key themes that determined the basis of these colonial alliances in the
end game of empire, we will ﬁrst survey the allies and their aspirations and expectations.
European colonial powers held the dominant position in these asymmetric wars, and they
often used local auxiliaries to turn insurgency into civil war—immensely destructive for all
the indigenous forces draw in on both sides, but effectively limiting the level of military
commitment required from the metropole. Loyal allies might still emerge victorious in
such conditions, but the political cost would be heavy when colonial exit came. The sec-
ond part of this introduction will then examine the impact of exit, highlighting the conse-
quences this had for the allies left behind. The distinctive character of the European
counter-insurgency campaigns fought after 1945 was the key feature of exit, and in these
‘small wars’, loyalist forces played prominent roles. Their ability to use their military posi-
tion to negotiate a more advantageous political future for themselves in the exit settle-
ment came to be critical in determining the fate of loyalist communities, a feature that
has been overlooked both by historians of decolonization and by political scientists and
military historians who analyse the counter-insurgency campaigns that so often formed
the critical prelude to exit.
Allies and empires
In December 1951, Britain’s campaign against the communist insurgents of Malaya
National Liberation Army (MNLA) was in crisis. The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney,
had been assassinated two months earlier. His successor, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer,
was not yet in post. The insurgency, dominated by Malaya’s Chinese community, held the
upper hand. In advance of Templer’s arrival, British ofﬁcials and ofﬁcers spent much time
debating what more could be done to check the progress of the insurgents. Malaya’s Brit-
ish rulers came to realize that loyalists recruited from among the Chinese population
could be the most effective wielders of the destructive power of counter-insurgency. As
the chairman of Perak’s War Executive Committee put it in December 1951, ‘the emer-
gency must develop or must be made to develop into a “civil war” amongst the Chinese
before quick and substantial progress can be achieved with Chinese assistance.’21 The
190,000 members of the Home Guard, the armed militia that, like the insurgency, was
dominated by Chinese rank-and-ﬁle, were accordingly thrust into the battle.22
British military commanders and civilian administrators reached similar conclusions
elsewhere in empire in its ﬁnal tumultuous decades. Across the full spectrum of Britain’s
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wars of decolonization, local ‘loyalist’ forces were recruited amongst indigenous commu-
nities and empowered to enact counter-insurgency. Ethnicity and identity were as impor-
tant in this politics of divide-and-rule as was ideology. In Kenya, the loyalists were drawn
from the same ethnic community, the Kikuyu, as the Mau Mau insurgents.23 In Cyprus, eth-
nic divisions between Turkish and Greek communities were exploited and Turks recruited
into the auxiliary police to confront the EOKA campaign for enosis.24 In Malaya, the Chi-
nese members of the Home Guard fought alongside Malay and Indian.25 The result was, in
Charles Townshend’s words, Britain’s civil wars: a series of conﬂicts that did not just mark
the end of the British imperial age but which also scarred the communities embroiled in
them for decades to come.26
As the essays gathered together in this special issue of the International History Review
make clear, this story of local alliance in British colonial counter-insurgency was in fact
part of a wider global history of the changing nature of warfare in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury.27 Dutch, French and Portuguese colonists would each adopt policies similar to those
of their British counterparts. These declining imperial powers were either unable or unwill-
ing to commit sizeable numbers of regular troops in colonial wars,28 or found their con-
ventional military tactics and strategies to be inadequate in the face of the people’s war
mounted by nationalist insurgencies across the colonial world.29 The European colonial
powers, denuded of the military superiority that had allowed them to hold sway in earlier
decades, now waged war by proxy: relying on the support of locally recruited militias and
auxiliaries drawn from colonized populations to ﬁght on behalf of the colonial regimes.
Counter-insurgency was thereby privatized by local actors, in a process similar to Stathis
Kalyvas’ description of the logic of irregular civil wars.30 Reliant upon such actors, imperial
military ambitions were sometimes bent and twisted to suit the localized agendas of their
indigenous partners. Local allies always had some degree of agency, even if its opportuni-
ties had to be seized when the moment was right.31
Though the word has uncomfortable connotations that might be questioned in some
of the cases to be examined in this collection, this was collaboration writ large. The afﬁlia-
tion and deployment of military auxiliaries recruited with the support of local political
allies, whether mercenaries or not, had long been part of the military and political history
of imperial expansion.32 Collaboration was nothing new. Indeed, for more than a genera-
tion past Ronald Robinson’s modestly titled ‘sketch for a theory of collaboration’ has pro-
foundly inﬂuenced scholarship on the relationship between imperial subjects and their
rulers, especially in regard to conquest, coercion and control. As Robinson explained, col-
laborative actors from among colonies and soon-to-be colonized societies were as vital to
the process of empire-building as the British administrators, politicians, bankers, soldiers
and missionaries that had once dominated the studies of British imperial history. Robinson
termed this local support for imperial rule the ‘non-European foundations of European
imperialism’.33
European imperial expansion was never stiﬂed by a shortage of aspiring collaborators.
Collaboration with ‘native polities’ became the norm and not the exception from the later
eighteenth century right through the nineteenth century, stoking the engine of imperial
expansion.34 It was at ﬁrst most visible on the battleﬁelds of conquest. Too often, notably
in South Asia and in many parts of Africa, local leaders initially collaborated because they
thought they could turn European military might to their own purposes. Across Africa,
local allies helped extend European power during the military conquest of much of the
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continent35—is eastern Africa, for example, Maasai auxiliaries crushed British enemies in
‘punitive expeditions’,36 while the standing army of the kingdom of Buganda was
deployed under British command as the ‘sub-imperialists’ of colonial conquest throughout
the inter-lacustrine lands after 1900.37 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, in the
age of ‘imperial recklessness’, as Porch terms it,38 European imperial powers escalated
their colonial ‘small wars’ and used increasingly brutal tactics, often enlarging the scale of
operations by securing and deploying local allies. The French forces in West Africa
depended upon local allies as they extended control through the Sahel in a last quarter of
the nineteenth century, while the British made use of a variety of African allies in their
campaigns against the Asante kingdom.39 Further aﬁeld, other allies played critical roles
in the other great imperial wars of the age. In South Asia, by the end of the eighteenth
century, the British military establishment entirely depended upon locally recruited forces
and the support of ‘friendlies’, while their enemies, as in the case of the Maratha Wars of
1803, themselves exploited imperial rivalries to employ European mercenaries.40 In China,
the British formed the ﬁrst Chinese Regiment as part of the efforts to suppress the Boxer
Rebellion.41
Collaboration then became critical to the functioning of the new colonial states estab-
lished after conquest was complete—precisely the everyday, bureaucratic aspect of colo-
nial governance that Robinson’s ‘theory’ sought to highlight. British imperialists codiﬁed
their relationships with collaborating elites through indirect rule and customary law, con-
structing emergent castes and classes whose ‘loyalty’ was garnered through participation
but not incorporation, while their French counterparts created opportunities for the pre-
ferment of those who afﬁliated with the colonial project that at least held the possibility
of full equality.42 Loyalism became sharpest at times of rebellion and insurrection, when it
must inevitably be put to the test, but it need not originate in conﬂict. Notions of loyalty
were most often constructed through the ordinary functions of colonial governance, as
African and Asian subalterns made their own ‘bargain of collaboration’.43
Inducement brought loyalists into the imperial fold, but the rewards for loyalty gener-
ally declined as its practice became more common. The limits of reward came also to be
determined by race, especially, though not exclusively, within the British Empire. With the
rise of racial ideology in the wake of the Indian Rebellion, the Morant Bay uprising of 1865
and the American Civil War, ideas of race became more inﬂuential in the conduct of the
day-to-day business of British imperialism,44 and this adjusted the terms upon which col-
laboration might be negotiated. Among British imperialists, as Catherine Hall has tren-
chantly observed, ‘their enthusiasm for racialised others was strictly limited’.45 This trend
to prejudice was less pervasive in the French empire, where the separation of colonial sub-
jects from metropolitan citizens was less absolute,46 whilst in the Portuguese empire ques-
tions of race were mediated, and thus rendered more complex, by the large mestico
populations in Angola and elsewhere.47 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, it
was generally true across all of the European empires that the status and position of non-
white intermediaries had diminished.48
Such ideas bled into military strategy. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
prevailing wisdom was that regular forces were best placed to counter irregular oppo-
nents.49 According to the most-respected expert of the day, Charles Callwell, local popula-
tions were not to be trusted but could be used as scouts or to provide basic intelligence
on the movements of the enemy.50 His ‘semi-ofﬁcial manual’ for the conduct of small
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wars gave little further consideration to the more extensive use of irregular troops made
up of members of local populations and none to the encouragement of broader political
opposition to the anti-colonial cause.51 Callwell’s ideas were echoed in practice during the
South African War. At its outbreak in 1899, High Commissioner Alfred Milner was con-
vinced of the futility of irregular paramilitary units attempting to repulse attacks from the
Transvaal and Orange Free State: ‘In no cases should a number of small and weak town
guards be formed.’ Milner understood that this meant loyalists were to be left to their fate
in case of Boer offensives, but he thought, ‘To arm loyalists where they are hopelessly out-
numbered is to incite attack’.52 In particular, Milner and other British and white South Afri-
can political leaders were much exercised by any suggestion of arming black and
Coloured communities in the Cape and Natal colonies.53 Despite such fears, as scouts, por-
ters, guides, spies, members of militias and troops, more than 100,000 black and Coloured
loyalists collectively played a decisive role in the war; perhaps nearly a third of these men
were armed by 1902. Moreover, by providing their support to the British non-combatant
black and Coloured loyalists ‘effectively closed hundreds of square miles of the annexed
states to commando penetration’ and denied their labour to Afrikaner employers sympa-
thetic to the Boer cause.54
Champions of black and Coloured involvement in the war effort hoped to receive
reward in the form of at least a halt to the erosion of the rights and claims to citizenship
of Southern Africa’s non-white communities. But their bargain was lost. Instead, segrega-
tionist social and economic policies were introduced in the Transvaal, where the franchise
remained off limits to black and Coloured communities. In the Cape and Natal, the politi-
cal rights of black and Coloured voters were subject to more stringent qualiﬁcations and
restrictions imposed on their ability to buy land.55 For the indigenous allies of empire, the
military costs of loyalty were not always matched by the political rewards to be gained.
The perpetration of violence on behalf of the Empire or a colonial state always threated to
be a way of colonial subjects claiming the rights of imperial citizenship. As long as its
members jealously guarded an ethnically and racially exclusive notion of citizenship
within empire, the prospective path to citizenship that seemed to be opened by loyalty
meant loyalists drawn from the ranks of imperial subjects were to be scorned. Consider-
able efforts were made in South Africa and other settings to limit the ability of non-white
subjects to perpetrate violence on behalf of the colonial and imperial state and to obscure
the fact that this was, in reality, happening. South Africa was an extreme example, but the
efﬁcacy of loyalty as a political strategy practiced by colonized peoples to blunt dull the
edges of imperial rule seemed to have run its course by the late 1920s.
Exits from empire
The struggles triggered by the efforts to establish a new world order after 1945 resur-
rected loyalty and collaboration as effective strategies within the imperial world. War and
insurrection tested loyalty as nothing else could. As France, Britain and the Netherlands
tried to re-establish their control of parts of their empires lost to enemy occupation in the
Second World War, they looked to local allies to consolidate their political hold.56 But
nationalisms now complicated the politics of afﬁliation all over Africa and Asia. Anti-impe-
rial rhetoric was not only a product of new Cold War solidarities after 1945. Though it
emerged very powerfully within many local nationalist movements over the course of the
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1940s, it had taken root in the radical leadership of the many ‘small struggles’ against
forms of colonial domination during the inter-war years.57 Radicals scattered throughout
the colonial world now found new connections, and a kind of common purpose in the
international politics of the post-war world. The comfortable ease of functional, daily col-
laborations practised by colonial subalterns in the service of empires58 became politically
toxic. Loyalty to empire was now denigrated as betrayal, its adherents castigated as ‘self-
seeking scoundrels’ and the ‘running dogs of imperialism’.59
The nature of colonial warfare was also transformed by the end of the 1940s, and this
altered the terms upon which the bargain with loyalists would be made. Although guer-
rilla wars had been part of modern military history throughout much of the world, in the
period after the Second World War ‘an unprecedented number of resistance struggles in
Europe and Asia brought belief in the concept of people’s war to a new level… .’ Across
the imperial world, anti-colonial movements became guerrilla armies to great effect.
South-East Asia, subject to both the experience of resistance to the Japanese occupation
and particularly the intense inﬂuence of Mao’s approach to guerrilla war, ‘was the epi-
centre of this earthquake’.60 Insurgencies swept across the colonial world, often supported
by external actors and increasingly able to adopt the moral high ground against oppres-
sive imperialisms. French, British, Dutch and Portuguese colonialists fought hard to resist
each individual rising, but were ultimately overwhelmed by the global character of the
movements they confronted.61 The French, especially, were out-ﬂanked and undermined
by the international credentials of the insurgents they faced in Indo-China and in Alge-
ria.62 As Thomas and Thompson conclude, ‘the “weak” won the battles of decolonisation
because they were better than the strong in maintaining transnational networks of sup-
port’.63 And as colonialism crumbled, the new world order embraced national liberation
movements as legitimate, Geneva Protocol 1 of 1977 enhancing ‘the powers of the insur-
gent in relation to the state by justifying resort to war in the struggle against colonial
domination, racism, and foreign occupation’.64 This all reinforced the justice of anti-colo-
nial struggle, and legitimized its violence, allowing nationalists to present their escape
from the shackles of colonialism as part of their nation-building once independence was
won.65 In this narrative, there was no place for those who had fought against liberation.
Important though counter-insurgency warfare proved to be, the dynamic of loyalist
politics cannot be fully explained only with reference to armed struggle. Wider political
aspirations drove anti-colonial rebellion, and after 1945, these rapidly came to be inﬂu-
enced by global trends. This broader context of decolonization transformed imperial
notions of citizenship, as well as altering how the colonial powers assessed their future
geo-politics. The politics of maintaining colonial order would transform into the politics of
Cold War afﬁliation. In the post-war era, what Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson
describe as ‘the imperialism of decolonization’ thus demanded that relationships with loy-
alists be reconstituted at the denouement of empire.66 The loyalty of colonized peoples
was no longer scorned and left unrecognized: it was now an afﬁliation that had practical
signiﬁcance in the present struggle, and future importance for building strategic and polit-
ical inﬂuence. In the end game of empire, loyalism therefore came to be embraced and
encouraged with promises of rewards—as several of the essays in this collection illustrate.
Chinese loyalty allowed Chinese elites in Malaya to win guarantees of citizenship for all
Malaya-born residents of the new nation in 1957.67 Loyal Kikuyu in Kenya took up a privi-
leged position within the fraught, protracted negotiations leading up to Kenyan
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independence in 1963.68 Turkish-Cypriot loyalty provided a mechanism by which the
Turkish state became embroiled in the debates surrounding Cypriot citizenship and post-
colonial sovereignty.69 The harkis of Algeria70 and the Angolan servicemen in the Portu-
guese armed forces71 similarly stretched and challenged metropolitan notions of national
identity and citizenship in a decolonizing world.
The imperial allies discussed in this special issue were active participants in efforts to
remake relationships between former (and soon-to-be-former) colonies and the post-colo-
nial world. Some of the ‘new allies’ in the post-colonial world were in fact reinvented relics
of the imperial age, such as the mercenaries and their supporters who defeated the insur-
gent nationalists in the Congo after 1963, an alliance of anti-communists and anti-nation-
alists born again in the cauldron of Africa’s emergent Cold War politics.72 But other
imperial allies were new actors determined to explore the possibilities for remaking indi-
vidual colonies and post-colonies in a new global order—Algeria’s nationalists were
embroiled in Cold War connections long before the French left,73 while Angola’s colonial
soldiers would become combatants in the Cold War struggles that brought Cuban forces
into the country and a South African covert invasion. Across the decolonizing world, from
the southern Arabian Peninsula74 to South-East Asia,75 imperial loyalty offered a form of
certainty and citizenship in a desperately unpredictable and complicated age. As always,
as Johnson demonstrates in the Arabian case, loyalty allowed for the access to resources
to protect local networks and political agendas. Such resources made loyalists important
targets for insurgent violence. Loyalists did not simply represent a military threat, but also
a profound challenge to the certainties of nationalist ideas of nation and citizenship.76
From such a perspective, the victimization of loyalists was often understood by its perpe-
trators as functional to state-building and its required solidarities, thus legitimizing vio-
lence as vengeance and cleansing—enacted as very public reprisal in Algeria,77 and more
covertly but equally brutally in Kenya.78 But where nationalism was more opaque, or inter-
nally divided by factionalism, loyalists could remake themselves as nationalists and escape
retribution, as Oliveira explains for Angola.79 Where oppression was enforced with sufﬁcient
rigour to suppress nationalist politics as well as defeat the insurgency, as in Kenya, it was
even possible for loyalists to win the peace and seize control of the post-colonial state.80
Whether abandoned and victimized, as in Aden and Algeria, or victorious, as in Kenya,
these allies of late imperial power helped shape the post-colonial world. Their histories
need to be reintegrated into the local histories of decolonization, and their signiﬁcance
for the emerging Cold War properly considered. New nations were formed from territories
with economies and political structures dominated by connections to the outside world
as a consequence of imperial rule and the forms of informal inﬂuence that predated Euro-
pean colonialism.81 The fate of loyalists within them reveals much about the extent to
which nationalism in any one territory aspired to remaking those external connections in
the aftermath of imperial exit.
Finally, we should note that the case made here for studying allies in the conﬂicts at the
end of empire has a resonance that carries forward into other examples of exit from less
conventional imperialist settings in the Cold War era. There can be no more compelling
example of the political dynamics of loyalism at the point of exit than the American evacu-
ation of Saigon in 1975, at the end of the Vietnam War. US ofﬁcials estimated that there
were over 2 million South Vietnamese anti-communist ‘loyalists’ who might seek refuge in
America if such opportunity was presented. This was a further price the US was not
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prepared to pay for a war that had already drained the national coffers, creating a moun-
tain of public debt and poisoning the patriotism of an entire generation. Operation Fre-
quent Wind saw the evacuation of thousands of American personnel, along with some of
their most trusted South Vietnamese allies, but the vast bulk of the local loyalist cadres
were left to their fate.82 Graphic images of the Saigon evacuation, captured in newsreel
footage broadcast by America television channels, exposed the dilemmas of US policy
decision-making to public gaze.83 Vietnam revealed and exposed the hazards of afﬁliation
without secure reward when exit came.
Dilemmas of a different kind confronted the black loyalist military units deployed in
southern Angola, and in Namibia, during the protracted Border War fought by South
Africa from the mid-1960s until 1989.84 This war comprised of multiple counter-insurgency
campaigns that closely resembled the small wars of decolonization in the 1950s and
1960s, and the use of black loyalist units remains one of its most controversial aspects.
The most infamous of all these units, the 32nd (Buffalo) Battalion was not accepted into
the reformed South African Defence Forces by the incoming African National Congress
(ANC) government in 1994, and was disbanded.85 Here, again, the loyalist bargain could
not be fulﬁlled at exit.
Might more recent armed insurrections, including the international ‘interventions’
linked to both the global war on terror and the Arab Spring,86 also offer useful compari-
sons with the loyalist militia afﬁliations of the small wars of decolonization? Having previ-
ously largely neglected the part played by state-sponsored militias in conﬂict, in favour of
an overwhelming concentration on the dynamics of insurgent groups, political scientists
have recently ‘discovered’ the signiﬁcance of what we would term ‘loyalist forces’ in all
kinds of modern counter-insurgencies. Amongst the rich array of work recently pub-
lished,87 Jentzsch et al. have called for detailed engagement with the multiple cases
where local militias have been recruited to assist the incumbent forces of the state in their
battles against insurgents.88 Though the focus of political science research on this ques-
tion has concentrated on conﬂicts since the 1980s,89 and especially since the end of the
Cold War, there is clearly considerable value to be gained from including Cold War and
late colonial wars of decolonization examples in such comparative studies. From all of
these cases, historical and more contemporary, there is a great deal yet to be learned
about why local communities form militias to ﬁght against anti-government insurgents
and how loyalist bargains are struck. By making such broad comparisons, we might then
understand whether the colonial cases reported in this collection were truly distinctive, or
part of a broader and more enduring pattern of counter-insurgency response.
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